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I. INTRODUCTION

A. CERCLA Background
Since the 1980's, contamination phobia has gripped industry,
government, and the public. The Love Canal disaster sparked the
Environmental Response,
creation of the Comprehensive
CERCLA was
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA").'
enacted in 19802 and strengthened by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act in 1986. 3 CERCLA's focus is twofold: the
identification, investigation, and clean-up of contaminated sites and
the allocation of financial responsibility for the clean-up. 4
* Col., JAGC, USAR (Ret.), S.J.D., associate adjunct professor
of law at Tulane Law School, lecturer in administrative and
environmental law at Loyola Law School, instructor in
environmental and administrative law at UNO Paralegal Studies
Program, and special counsel at Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent,
Carrere & Denegre, L.L.P., in New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see also JOHN
APPLEGATE, ET AL., THE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND

HAZARDOUS WASTE 883-885 (Foundation Press 2000).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2005); Pub. L. No. 96-510 (1980).
3. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No.
99-499 (1986).
4. APPLEGATE, supra note 1, at 869; see also Community
Environmental Response Facilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-426
(1992) (further amending CERCLA and dealing with oil recycling
exemptions); The Asset Conservation Lender Liability and Deposit
Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996)
(dealing with lenders and fiduciary exemptions); The Small Business
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As originally enacted, CERCLA did not envision the same type of
federal-state partnership as many other environmental statutes like
the Clean Water Act,5 the Clean Air Act, 6 and the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 7 These latter statutes allow
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to
transfer primacy under these environmental laws to states to
administer, including permitting and enforcement, but subject to the
EPA continuing oversight.
However, the 2002 Brownfield
amendments to CERCLA give states more direct responsibility for
cleaning up certain "brownfield" sites.8
Although EPA was mainly in charge of CERCLA clean-ups before
2002, it could enter into cooperative agreements with states that can
have a lead in some CERCLA clean-ups. 9 Normally, EPA can use
federal funds to initiate investigations and clean-ups' or it can order
responsible parties to conduct clean-ups. When private entities are
ordered to conduct a clean-up, they may enforce CERCLA through
cost recovery and contribution actions. 12 The Superfund trust fund
has primarily financed EPA action over the years. 13 However, the
Superfund tax expired in 1995 and was not renewed. 14 This funding
void has required continued Congressional resolutions, using interest
earned on cost recovery, or reliance on EPA abatement orders to
potentially responsible parties, and opened the option for more state
involvement in CERCLA clean-ups.
EPA may make extensive use of Superfunds for longer-term
remedial actions, but may make only limited use of the Superfunds
for short-term removal actions. 15 To be classified as a longer-term
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107118 (2002).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2005).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2005).
7. Id. § 6901.
8. The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118 (2002).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), (c), (d) (2004).
10. Id. § 9604.
11. Id.§ 9606 (2002).
12. Id. §§ 9607, 9613(f) (2005).
13. Hazardous Substance Superfund, 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2005).
14. APPLEGATE, supra note 1, at 1023.
15. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(5) (2003).
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remedial action EPA must declare a site, through a hazard analysis
and rule making, to be one of the most contaminated properties in the
nation. This declaration will place the site on the National Priorities
List ("NPL") and enable the EPA to make almost unlimited use of
Superfunds. 16 NPL status is not required for the short-term removal
actions, for EPA abatement orders issued to private parties to cleanup, or for purely private remediation. All clean-ups must follow the
National Contingency Plan ("NCP"). 17 The NCP is the blueprint for
a CERCLA site's evaluation, investigation, documentation, and
remediation. The NCP applies to both private clean-ups as well as
EPA clean-ups.18
Perhaps the heart of CERCLA is its cost recovery action, which
applies to both EPA and states seeking response cost recovery, as
well as to private parties seeking cost recovery or contribution. The
elements of CERCLA liability that lead to cost recovery lawsuits are
the following: "a release or threatened release, of a hazardous
substance, from a facility, which causes the incurrence of response
costs, filed against a defendant who is a potentially responsible
party." 19 Potentially responsible parties include those with a status as
owner, operator, arranger, generator, and in some cases transporter,
of waste at a contaminated property. CERCLA's liability is
retroactive, strict, and joint and several.20
CERCLA has not been a failure by any means. After twenty years,
6,400 removal actions reduced immediate threats. 21 Of 1,450 final
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (2005). See Carus Chemical Co. v.
EPA, 395 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2005), for judicial review of such
listings.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (2005); 40 C.F.R Part 300 (2005).
18. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (2005).
19. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.
1989). For a more elaborate discussion of the scope of CERCLA
liability see Stanley Millan, The Fifth Circuit's Wetland
Determination and SuperFund Liability Requirements, 40 LOY. L.
REV. 581, 611 (1994); and STANLEY MILLAN ET AL., LOUISIANA
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, §§ 4:5-4:11 (Thomson-West 2004).
20. MILLAN ET AL., supra note 19, at § 4:11; see also United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
21. U.S. EPA, Fulfilling the Promise of Earth Day, 5-1 (2000), at
www.epa.gov/superfund/action/20years/ ch5pgl.htm (last visited
May 20, 2005).
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NPL sites, 219 were deleted and 1,200 have had final clean-up plans
approved. 22 Of 59 proposed NPL sites, 28 are already subject to
clean-up. 23 Six hundred fifty five-year reviews by EPA of cleanedup sites 24have been conducted to ensure effectiveness of prior
remedies.
Responsible parties have performed over 70 percent of
new clean-ups at NPL sites since 1992. 25 Private party settlements
have a value of $18 billion. 26 Love Canal has been cleaned up and is
now considered a desirable place to live.2 7 Three million, four
hundred thousand cubic yards of contaminated soil and sediment
were cleaned up under EPA in fiscal year 2004. 28 These statistics,
however, do not cover the estimated 450,000-1,000,000 brownfield
sites in the United States,29 nor do they assure that performance in
terms of human exposure and groundwater contamination are under
control. Statistics on contamination are not well tracked worldwide,
nor are environmental indicators useful for informed decisionmaking well developed. 30 EPA estimates that at least $253 billion in
today's dollars will still be needed to clean up many of these
CERCLA sites, including some brownfield sites, over the next
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. U.S. EPA, Enforcement and Compliance Results: Numbers at
a Glance (2004), at http://www. epa.gov/compliance/resources/
reports/endofyear/eoy2004/ 2004numbers.html (Last visited May 20,
2005).
29. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Community Development:
Local Growth Issues - Federal Opportunities and Challenges
(RCED-00-178) 118 (Sept. 2000) (hereinafter GAO-Community
Development); see also, National Association of Local Government
Environmental Professionals, Unlocking Brownfields Keys to
Community Revitalization (Northwest-Midwest Institute 2004), at 2,
available
at
http://www.resourcesaver.org/file/
toolmanager/CustomOl6C45F63039.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005).
(hereinafterNorthwest-Midwest Institute)
30. U.S. Gen Accounting Office, Environmental Indicators Better Coordination is Needed to Develop Environmental Indicators
Sets That Inform Decisions, GAO-05-52 (Nov. 2004).
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several decades. 3 ' CERCLA's advancement of our quality of life
still can be demonstrated better. Site responsibility should expand,
not contract.
This background is the baseline to discuss the scope of CERCLA
liability. These various recent developments have changed for the
better the poor fortune of some potentially liable parties and created
uncertainties or "black holes" for others. They are also the focus of
this article. Rather than answer questions, this article seeks to ask
more questions in a light different than the usual technical bend of
CERCLA writings.

II. SUSTAINABILITY

In evaluating the reversal of fortunes and black holes, we must
bear in mind the unitary focus of CERCLA among environmental
laws. CERCLA requires reporting of new releases, but unlike the
thrust of most environmental laws, which are forward looking into
permitting and management of pollution media regimes, CERCLA is
mostly backward looking. It mostly looks to clean-up the results of
past contamination. Therefore, it may conflict with one basic theme
of environmental law to "save the planet". CERCLA's thrust seeks
to undo, not save, though additional natural resource damages may
result in partial recreation of damaged (contaminated) resources.
Sustainability must be the touchstone of any statutory program that is
geared to saving anything. Does CERCLA promote environmentally
responsible reuse of restored areas?
Too many decades of growth, pollution, and contamination, may
have pushed the earth beyond the event horizon of saving in a literal
sense. Its carrying capacity to support life could be diminished. This
reminds us of the Malthus and Neo-Malthus doctrines that growth
and physical existence cannot co-exist. 33 Is an industrialized society

31. U.S. EPA, Cleaning Up the Nation's Waste Sites: Market and
Technology Trends, (Sept. 2004), at xiii to ix.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
33. See Thomas Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population
(1798) at http://www.ac.wwu.edu/-stephan/malthus/malthus.0.html
(last visited May 20, 2005); See also Ann F. Wolfgram, Population,
Resources & Environment: A Survey of the Debate (The Catholic
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compatible with a pristine world? Are high baseline cancer rates
34
indicative of poor carrying capacity or of poor quality life styles?
However, the earth can be restored, but selectively. Many other
environmental laws have restoration as a goal, though not perhaps as
unitary as in CERCLA. For instance, the Oil Pollution Act provides
for oil removal and natural resource restoration; 35 the Clean Water
Act provides for improvement of water quality through its own
regime of establishing total maximum daily loads;3 6 the Endangered
Species Act provides for species recovery plans; 37 the Clean Air Act
provides for clean-up of dirty ambient air known as non-attainment
areas; 38 RCRA provides for corrective action at contaminated areas
of regulated hazardous waste sites; 39 and last but not least, wetlands
can be restored by monitoring and mitigating illegal wetland filling
activities. 40
Federal funding for such vast projects as the
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Program is available, and the
future Louisiana coastal restoration is another example of a
restoration as a means to "save" the planet, albeit more in the form of
natural resources recreation rather than mere remediation. 4 1
Despite the reported statistical success of CERCLA, we must see if
the lessons learned from the various reversals of fortune and black
holes recently opened in CERCLA are consistent with use of
recovery in saving the earth. Is CERCLA, through actions of all
branches of government as well as voluntary initiatives, achieving
sustainable development? By this, do we mean: are CERCLA's

University
of
America),
at
http://arts-sciences.cua.edu/
econ/faculty/aguirre/resenv.htm (last visited May 20, 2005).
34. APPLEGATE, supra note 1, at 70-72.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2005).
36. Id. § 1313(d).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1973).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7515 (2005).
39. Id. § 6930(h).
40. See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance
Ltr. No. 02-2 (Dec. 24, 2002).
41. See Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration
Task Force Website, (U.S.G.S.National Wetlands Research Center),
at http://www.lacoast.gov (last visited May 20, 2005).
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trends meeting the 42needs of the present without adversely affecting
future generations?
III. REVERSALS OF FORTUNE
A. Lenders and Fiduciaries
At face value, it would not seem that a financial institution would
be a liable party under CERCLA. However, CERCLA has cast a
broad fishnet over potentially responsible parties. They include
present owners or operators of contaminated property, past owners or
operators of contaminated property if the waste was disposed of
during their tenure,43 arrangers who are generators of hazardous
substances at disposal sites, and transporters who transport hazardous
substances to the disposal sites they select. 44 Where are the lenders?
Lenders can face exposure to environmental liability under
CERCLA in several ways. One such way is if property ownership
transfers to the lender upon a customer default on a real estate loan
which turns out to be on contaminated property. 45 The real estate
security is simply unmarketable. The customer may not be able to
repay a loan if she faces environmental liability for remediation.
Lenders may also face losses if a senior lien that they 46
expect to have
on a property is primed by a super environmental lien. Finally, and
more relevant to direct CERCLA liability, if a lender forecloses upon
secured property, it may be exposed to liability as the new owner or
operator of contaminated property.47

42. Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9
& POL'Y F. 187 (1999).
43. The judicial trend is away from holding as liable past
owners/operators who merely suffer passive migration of
contamination, e.g., previously contaminated groundwater seepage
(but not leaking drums or tanks), during their ownership or
occupancy. See Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d
863 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 971 (2002). This could be
another good reversal of fortune for some past owners and operators.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2002).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E).
46. See, e.g., LA. REV.STAT. § 30:2281 (2004).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E).
DUKE ENVTL. L.
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For instance, a lender which forecloses on property and then
contracts to have the property "broom clean [ed]", during which time
asbestos in buildings and drums stored on the land are adversely
affected, the lender loses its safe harbor provisions under
CERCLA. 48 In the Fleet Factors case, the lender became liable
under Section 9607(a)(2) of CERCLA due to its participation in
financial management, to a degree indicating its49capacity to influence
a corporation's treatment of hazardous waste.
The result in Fleet
Factors involved the day-to-day operations of the facility; the court
held that it is not necessary for the secured creditor to participate in
50
management decisions relating to hazardous waste to incur liability.
A secured creditor can be liable if its involvement with the
management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the
inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it
chooses.
CERCLA liability can attach if a lender acquires
contaminated property through foreclosure. 5 1 Lenders have migrated
from a safe harbor to be liable parties under CERCLA, a definite
reversal of fortune.
EPA has "intervened" and promulgated a rule to protect lenders
from both foreclosure and repurchase at a foreclosures sale as long as
the transactions are simply mechanisms for protecting security
interest and the foreclosing lender acts quickly to divest itself of the
property. 52 A court invalidated the rule holding that CERCLA does
not delegate authority to EPA to define potentially liable parties

48. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58,
nn.13-14 (11th Cir. 1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)
(excluding from the list of potential responsible parties as an owner
or operator any person who held indicia of ownership in a facility, in
order to protect a security interest without participating in
management of a facility).
49. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557-60; see also 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(E).
50. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557-60; see also 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(E).
51. See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732
F.Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1999); United States v. Md. Bank & Trust
Co., 632 F.Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
52. Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (Apr.
29, 1992).
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through a regulation. 53 Lenders' lost fortune was saved by Congress
in 1996, however, in the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and
Deposit Insurance Protection Act, which specifically rejected the
capacity of the influence test espoused by Fleet Factors.54 Now
lenders must actually participate in the management or operational
phase of a borrower to be a liable party under CERCLA.55 A lender
will not become owner/operator through acquisition of contaminated
property by foreclosure or by undertaking related post-foreclosure
activities.
This law also provides a safe harbor for fiduciaries.57
Undertaking responsibility for hazardous
substances or negligence,
58
however, could bar the safe harbor.
It would appear that the lender and fiduciaries statutory successes
here are consistent with a sustainable environment. CERCLA
embodies the principle that the polluter pays. In one sense, a mere
lender or fiduciary which is servicing a customer has nothing directly
to do with contamination. Only if the lender or fiduciary takes over
site operations would it stand in the shoes of a polluter. 59 These
financiers are enabling polluting activities to continue by their
funding mechanisms. Fleet Factors expanded lenders' roles into
being anti-pollution barons. If other potentially responsible parties
are not found, the Superfund would have to bear the cost of the
clean-up but for another deep pocket target. The statutory safe
harbors for lenders and fiduciaries will protect them as long as they
act as lenders and fiduciaries and do not take a more active role at the
contaminated facility. It is an unfortunate consequence to future
sustainability that we have lost the direct incentives for these barons.
Responsible lenders may still be environmental police for their
customers at least out of fear that jurisprudence has not cloaked them
with ironclad interpretations of the 1996 amendments.

53. Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(i)(I)-(II).
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 9607(n)(5)(A).
58. See, e.g., Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Nationsbank, N.A., 183
F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(i)(I)-(II).
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B. Recyclers
CERCLA can deem automobile dealers and service station owners
60
as potentially responsible parties if they disposed of used waste oil.
This is true for any business that ships used oil to a site for recycling
only to find that they are liable for substantial clean-up costs even if
they had no knowledge
that the oil recycling site was releasing
6
hazardous substances.
Businesses that dispose of used oil can now avoid CERCLA
liability if they qualify for a service station dealer's exemption under
Section 9614(c) of CERCLA.62 The conditions of the exemption are
fourfold. First, the entity claiming the exemption must be a service
station, filling station, garage or similar establishment in the business
of selling, repairing, or servicing motor vehicles. 63 Second, the
establishment must accept used oil from do-it-yourselfers, i.e., one
who accepts used oil from the owner of a light duty motor vehicle or
household appliance, and who presents used oil to the oil recycling
facility. 64 Third, the used oil must not have mixed with any other
hazardous substance. 65 Finally, the used oil must be stored,
transported and otherwise
managed in compliance with state and
66
federal regulations.
There is little guidance as to how much a service station must do to
notify do-it-yourselfers of their acceptance of used oil. Service
station dealers should post a notice, keep a log detailing the identities
of the do-it-yourselfers that utilize the service, insure they accept

60. See Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 152425 (D. Utah 1995); see also Nixon-Egli Equip. Co. v. John A.
Alexander Co., 949 F. Supp. 1435, 1441-42 (D. Cal. 1996).
61. See Ekotek, 881 F. Supp at 1524-25; see also Nixon Egli, 949
F. Supp. At 1441-42.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(37), 9614(c). See United States v. Gurley,
384 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 2005).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 279 (2003).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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some used oil from do-it-yourselfers annually, and separate used oil
from all of the other waste.67
Although constituents of used oil, such as heavy metals, can
certainly constitute hazardous substances under CERCLA and
warrant clean-up if a site is contaminated from waste oil,68 this
CERCLA exemption seeks to sever dealers who service the
community and who properly manage and recycle used oil from
those who wantonly mismanage used oil. These responsible dealers
must engage in best management practices in storing, transporting
and delivering used oil for recycling; 69 therefore, they are not likely
to be future polluters who should pay for clean-up. As long as the
dealers follow the statute, their potential for CERCLA liability is
minimized, simply because they are not arranging to have hazardous
substances disposed of at a potentially contaminated site. Therefore,
servicing the community and preventing pollution certainly seems to
be in accordance with sustainable development, even though past
practices of similar entities may have been substandard.
C. Parent Corporations
Corporations may be responsible parties under CERCLA.7 °
Corporations achieved somewhat of an environmental boom in 1998.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Bestfoods held that parent
corporations are not liable for the acts of their subsidiaries solely
because of the exercise of control through stock ownership. 7 The
Court further held that the dual status of some or all directors or
officers of the parent corporations at the subsidiary level did not
translate to environmental liability under CERCLA. The Court also
held that as a matter of common law, the corporate veil might be
73
pierced, thus holding shareholders liable for corporate conduct.
67. Sherylin Young & Claire Howard, You Dump It, You Drink It:
Superfund and the Service Station Dealer's Exemption, available at
http://www.rathlaw.com/environmental.htm.
68. See Ekotek, 881 F. Supp at 1524-25; Nixon Egli; 949 F. Supp.
at 1441-42..
69. 40 C.F.R. §§279, Subpart C, and 279.30(b) (2004).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
71. 524 U.S. 51, 56 (1998).
72. Id.at 62.
73. Id. at 61-62.
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Nothing in CERCLA rewrote these well-settled rules of corporate
law. Therefore, a parent corporation could be held directly liable
under CERCLA for its own actions in operating a facility owned by
the subsidiary.
CERCLA defines "operator" as one who manages, directs, or
controls operations specifically related to pollution at the subsidiary's
facility. 74 A parent company's direct liability under CERCLA for
subsidiary facilities is based on the parent's actual control over the
facility in question.75 The parent's actual control is evidenced by
participation in the activities at the subsidiary's facility. 76 In
Bestfoods, the Court held that operation under CERCLA was
77
something more than "mechanical activation of pumps and valves."
Operation includes "the exercise and direction of a facility's
operation." ,78 A parent's activities at the facility, which are consistent
with parent corporations' investment status, such as monitoring of
the subsidiary's performance, supervision of subsidiary's financing
and budget decision, and issuance of general policy and procedures
would not rise to the level of direct parent control. 79 A parent's
provision of many functions for a small subsidiary, such as supplies,
personnel, accounting, tax, insurance, policies, inspection, or
consulting services through service agreements should not rise to the
level of operation. 80 Care should be taken that these particular
parent-subsidiary oversight functions, when they touch directly upon
environmental management systems or decisions of a subsidiary's
facility, are structured between the subsidiary and outside consultants
directly, rather than through the parent's personnel itself.
Bestfoods, however, did not address certain other situations.
Neither the status of successor corporations who merged or acquired
shares of a potentially responsible party, 8 1 nor the status of a

74. 42 U.S.C. §9601 (20)(A)
75. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 67-68.
76. Id.. at 68.
77. Id..at 71.
78. Id.
79. Datron, Inc. v. CRA Holdings, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 736, 747
(W.D. Mich. 1999).
80. See Datron, 42 F. Supp. at 748.
81. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1988).
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corporation as an arranger of waste disposal were addressed. 82
Finally, the court did not consider whether corporate officers are
automatically absolved from liability if they personally participate in
the wrongdoing causing pollution; such as through the design
of, or
83
the faulty maintenance of structures that cause pollution.
The Bestfoods holding does not appear consistent with
sustainability. Where subsidiaries are fully funded and are capable
of defraying clean-up costs through earnings or insurance, the role of
the parent company is minimized. In those cases where, absent
fraud, the subsidiaries lack the assets or resources to fund clean-ups
caused by pollution of their own doing, the insulation provided by
Bestfoods does not serve well for long-term use of the site. Absent
Superfunds, a site may have to be abandoned and sustainability
suffers a void.
D. Municipal Generators
Municipal solid waste landfills have been a focus of CERCLA
action in the past. 84 The 2002 amendments to CERCLA have
85
exempted generators of municipal solid waste sent to NPL sites.
The exemption covers both residential property owners as well as
small businesses and their affiliates.
Municipal solid waste
includes household waste as well as commercial or industrial waste
that is essentially the same as household waste. 87 Commercial or
industrial waste is essentially the same as household waste and would
qualify as a municipal solid waste if it is collected as municipal solid
waste as part of normal services and contains the same relative
amount of hazardous substances as does typical single-family
household waste. 88 This includes food and yard waste, paper,
clothing, appliances, consumer product packaging, disposable
diapers, office supplies, cosmetics, glass and metal food containers,
82. See Gen. Corp. v. Olin Corp., 390 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2004).
83. See Norfolk S. Ry. v. Gee Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10784
(W.D. Ill. June 25, 2001).
84. See B. F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(p)(2002). See exception at § 9670(p)(2),
e.g., if MSW contributes significantly to clean-up costs.
86. § 9607(p)(1).
87. § 9607(p)(4).
88. Id.
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elementary or secondary school science waste, and household
hazardous waste.8 9 It does not include combustion ash or material
from manufacturing and processing operations that is not essentially
the same as normal household waste. 9° Contribution actions against
91
residents are barred except with respect to governmental actions.
For waste disposed of after April 1, 2001, the burden of proving the
exemption is on a party other than the governmental party; for waste
disposed of before April 1, 2001, the burden of proof is on the party
bringing the cost recovery or contribution action.
The exemption does not cover the municipality itself if it "owns"
the landfill.93 Furthermore, the exemption does not appear to apply to
the transporters of municipal solid waste, as opposed to the
generators. 94 Finally, the exemption applies only to Superfund sites
on the NPL; lesser contaminated
(non-NPL) sites would not benefit
95
exemption.
the
from
The new exemption, however, does not remove municipal solid
waste sites from the reaches of CERCLA; it just exempts certain
parties if municipal solid waste is exclusively involved.96 Municipal
solid waste may involve degrees of hazardous substances, so other
liable parties, including municipalities, possibly transporters, and
generators who do not meet the proof requirement of the exemption,
would still be liable parties under CERCLA. 97 Although a headache
for many businesses, the exemption does appear to carve out a large
swath of potentially responsible parties who would no longer be
responsible in cost recovery actions. 98 To the extent the remaining
parties can fund the clean-up, one can argue no harm, no foul.
Successful clean-up cost recovery may not always be the case and
the exemption may put a strain on shrinking Superfunds and other
parties.
To that extent, it is not consistent with sustainable
development.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

§ 9607(p)(4)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(p)(4)(C)(2002).
§ 9607(p)(6).
§ 9607(p)(5).
§ 9607(a)(1) and (p)(2).
§§9607(a)(4) and (p)(1).
42 U.S.C. §9607(p)(1)(2002).
§9607(p)
Id.
Id.
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E. Redevelopers

Considering the breadth of CERCLA liability, developers and
lenders have been reluctant to invest in what had been called
"brownfields" properties.99 These are properties historically known
or suspected to have contamination.°'3 Revitalization protects public
health, protects greenfields, increases tax base, creates jobs,
eliminates blight and urban sprawl, and brings vitality to
neighborhoods. 10 The developers and lenders fear that they would
with that property, or that
become liable for clean-up costs associated
02
the property would be worthless. 1
Besides providing for brownfield redevelopment grants and loans
to certain quasi-public and non-profit entities, t° ' the 2002
amendments to CERCLA have several liability exemptions to favor
the redevelopment of some contaminated properties. For instance,
historically, only an innocent purchaser would be exempt from
CERCLA liability for previously unknown contamination that
manifested during his or her tenure. 1 4 Now, bona fide prospective
purchasers (or their lessees) who acquired property after January 11,
contamination occurred prior
2002, will also be exempt if the known
0 5
to his or her acquisition of property.1
Unlike the innocent landowner who has no knowledge or reason to
know of any prior contamination, the post-2002 bona fide
prospective purchaser may actually know about contamination
10 6
during an appropriate environmental inquiry prior to the purchase.

99. APPLEGATE, supra, note 1, at 1026.
100. Id. § 9601(39)(B). These sites do not include NPL sites, sites
subject to CERCLA or RCRA orders, RCRA corrective action or
RCRA closure, certain federal lands, PCB sites under the Toxic
Substances Control Act or sites covered under the underground
storage tank trust fund.
101. Northwest-Midwest Institute, supra note 29, at 16-17.
102. APPLEGATE, supra, note 1, at 1026.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(39)(C), 9604(k). Congress must still
appropriate the funds annually.
104. Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
105. Id. § 9601(40).
106. Id. § 9607(r). However, EPA is entitled to a super lien on the
property to the extent property values are increased if it cleans up the
site.
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Additionally, the 2002 amendments to CERCLA add exemptions for
a past or present owner or operator of a site who has land contiguous
to a contaminated property, which became contaminated only due to
spillover from the contaminated property and through no fault of
their own. 10 7 Although these are reversals of fortune for parties who
may now acquire or develop property and are now free from
CERCLA liability, there are some unknowns associated with the
status of exempt parties in the 2002 exemptions related to what types
of duties and inquiries they must make with respect to any
contamination once it becomes known.
These unknowns, also
known as "black holes," are discussed in the next section.
These new exempt parties may participate in limited clean-up
under state voluntary clean-up laws and receive exemptions not only
from the state but possibly from CERCLA as well.' °8 CERCLA
amendments and the state laws create an incentive for the
redevelopment of brownfields by creating voluntary remediation
markets. Voluntary remediation or clean-up programs encourage
clean-up of brownfields in lieu of the use of greenfields for industrial
developments.
Besides receiving no further action letters or
certificates of completion from state agencies that give these
voluntary applicants exempt status in state clean-up law, EPA will
not pursue a potentially responsible party who cleans up a site
09
eligible for clean-up under approved state response programs.'
Windfall liens, however,
may still apply against bona fide
10
'
purchases.
prospective
The elements of a state clean-up program must include a timely
survey inventory of Brownfields sites, oversight and enforcement
authorities with respect to response actions, mechanism and
resources to provide for meaningful public participation, mechanisms
for approval of clean-up plans, and requirements for verification of
107. Id. § 9607(q).
108. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2285(A) (2004). There are
approximately nineteen states with voluntary clean-up statutes under
memorandum of agreement with EPA now. See generally
Environmental Protection Agency, Memoranda of Agreements on
State
Voluntary
Cleanup
Programs,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/statemoa.htm (last visited
May 25, 2005).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(39), (41), 9628.
110. Id. § 9607(r)(2).
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response actions."' The 2002 amendments to CERCLA still provide
for certain limited site re-openers in order for EPA to take action,
such as: state required assistance, migration of contamination across
state lines, which pose an imminent or substantial endangerment to
public health or the environment, necessary additional responses in
order to mitigate contaminant release if additional contamination
2
information about the site comes to the attention of EPA."
The basic thrust of the 2002 amendments is to allow EPA to focus
on the worst contaminated of the sites around the nation and leave to
the states and private parties the ability to address sites of lesser
environmental concern. As public input is required under both
federal and state laws for the clean-up of these lesser contaminated
sites under state voluntary clean-up programs,"1 3 it would appear at
face value that the new amendments do provide for sustainable
development. That is, they require some form of clean-up and
preserve the rights of states, third-parties, and the federal government
to seek follow-up response action and costs should additional
problems that are not the responsibility of the exempt and voluntary
clean-up parties crop up. 114 If this follow-up action fails, then so will
sustainability. There are also commercial standards that require
sustainability as part of brownfields sites redevelopment to aid the
cause of redevelopment, but these are keyed to the undefined "long
term" rather than expressly to future generations. 1 5 Community
relations seem to be a key under those standards.
F. Risk Assessors

When discussing risk assessors, consultants who worsen or spread
contamination due to their investigation or remediation and thereby

111. Id. § 9628(a)(2).
112. Id. § 9628(b)(1)(B).
113. 40 C.F.R. §§300.430(c), (b)(1)(i)(C) and 300.700 (b)(6)
(2004); MILLAN, ET AL., supra note 19, at 324.
114. MILLAN, ET AL., id. at 327.
115. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TESTING AND MATERIALS, E198403 Standard Guide for Brownfields Redevelopment, available at
http://www.astm.org (last visited May 25, 2005) (hereinafter
ASTM).
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become liable under CERCLA are not discussed here. 1 16 Instead, a
trend of clean-ups based on risk evaluations by experts is discussed.
This trend started with the government's reliance on risk assessment
in the late 1980's. 117 This trend basically worked down to a level at
which the government arguably tolerates death and disease and sets a
low-cost standard. 1 8 Zero risk is not a goal here.
One likely reason for the growth of risk assessment and related risk
management is that EPA realized it could not handle the plethora of
legislation it had to administer." 19 Additionally, the technology of
detection advanced significantly and it is virtually impossible to
regulate smaller and smaller levels of contamination. EPA did not
want to employ a disproportionate amount of resources on perceived
smaller problems if it could concentrate on protecting society against
larger problems.
Later in the 1990's, risk-based corrective action programs grew.
Risk-based clean-up levels are not based on the usually more
stringent background levels of contamination.' 2 1
Site-specific
criteria are often developed statistically for risk-based corrective
actions. 12 2 Under a typical risk-based program, "cookbook" health
standards of contamination are set forth in a table. 23 These
cookbook standards are screening levels that determine whether or
not further action is needed at a site. If any contamination is found
through an environmental assessment of the site, and the findings are
below the screening levels, no further action is required. 124 if,
however, the contaminants are found above screening levels, then the
116. See K.C. 1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1143
(W.D. Mo. 1998).
117. Interview of William Riley, former EPA Administrator (EPA,
October 1, 1993), at
www.epa.gov/history/publications/reilly/
20.htm.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Louisiana Risk-Based Corrective Action Program
(LDEQ 1998).
121. Robert S. Berger, et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie
County: Meeting the Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3
BuFF. ENVT'L. L. J. 69, 100-105 (1995).
122. See MILLAN, ET AL., supra note 19 at §§4:40 to 4:41.
123. See MILLAN, ET. AL, supra note 19, § 4:35.
124. Id. at §4:39.
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screening levels can be used for clean-up action levels of a
remediation program. 125 The potential purchasers of the site can
decide to manage the contaminated site by doing a site-specific riskanalysis that shows additional remediation is not justified at the
site. 121
Frequently, risk-based corrective actions are also
or
accompanied by engineering controls (e.g., slurry walls) 127
institutional controls (e.g., deed restrictions on residential use).
The clean-up standards vary and are lower for residential use than for
industrial usage. 128 These risk-based corrective actions can be used
not only for brownfields sites, but for other contaminated sites as
well. 129
Risk-based corrective action uses a tiered framework consisting of
a screening option and management options.' 30 Site evaluation and
corrective action can be tailored to specific sites.1 ' As levels of
contamination increase in the findings, the approach becomes even
more site-specific.' 32 Risk-based corrective action examines the total
risk profile of a contaminant. 133 For instance, when does a small
amount of benzene in groundwater pose a risk? Under a parking lot
or under a nursing home? Concentration, distance, ecology, and use
all have a bearing on risk-based corrective action.1 34 Although the
goal of corrective action is to protect human health and the
environment, critics of risk-based methods refer to risk-based
as "risking away" contamination, or "do nothing"
corrective action
35
clean-ups.
Owners of contaminated properties have experienced a small boom
from the growth in risk assessment into corrective action programs.
The immediate benefit is that clean-ups are often less expensive than

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at §4:36
Id. at §4:40 to 4:41.
Id. at §4:42.
Id. at §4:36.
Id. at §4:33 and 4:35.
Id. at §4:35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a pure health-based standard would require.' 36 One criticism of the
risk-based method is that it is not consistent with CERCLA. That is,
CERCLA clean-ups are focused on appropriate and relevant health
standards, and only at the time that a set of health-based levels1 is
37
achieved may economic feasibility be taken into account.
However, CERCLA does not oust cost-effectiveness and state
standards 38 from being appropriate for the degrees of clean-up
required. 1
Larger criticism, coupled with scientific uncertainty, points to the
fact that the effects of risk-based corrective action will mean private
actors will be allowed to shift their clean-up costs or harms on to
innocent third parties. Furthermore, the complex mathematical
processes used in risk-based corrective action limits the value of
public review and input. 139 In brownfields scenarios and voluntary
remediation programs, an innocent party may actually be the one
cleaning up a site, thus there is no cost shift to society since the
agency can still pursue any additional clean-up costs required against
another responsible party.
Well taken is the criticism that there are so many scientific layers
of review needed for risk assessment that the resulting decisions are
more inaccessible to the general public. The actual formal risk
assessments are buried under statistics and are difficult for the public
to understand. Mathematics is a concept; contamination is real.
How dangerous low levels of contamination are involves a trade-off
among concepts, reality and costs. Without valued public input, the
value of risk-based corrective actions is another unknown in the
realm of scientific uncertainties of appropriate clean-up levels.
To the extent that risk-based corrective action allows an agency
and innocent parties to obtain a bigger bang for the clean-up buck, it
does, in the broad sense, promote sustainability. Responsible parties
are not automatically free from the cost of additional clean-up unless
they too benefit from a "do nothing" clean-up. That anomaly can be
mitigated if site use is restricted to industrial purposes only.
Greenfields can be preserved.
Any long-term threats to the
136. Victoria B. Flatt, Essay: He Should at his Peril, Keep it
There: How the Common Law Tells Us that Risk-Based Corrective
Action is Wrong, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 341 (2001).
137. Id. at 345; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a)(d).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9621, 9628.
139. See Flatt, supra note 136 at 356-363.
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environment, such as groundwater contamination, would still have to
be borne out by the agency with resort to a windfall lien or cost
recovery from a responsible party to preserve the integrity of
sustainability in risk-based corrective actions.
IV. BLACK HOLES

A. Reasonable Landowners
In the previous section we saw that redevelopers enjoy a boom to
some extent from CERCLA liability. These non-liable owners
include previously described innocent landowners and bona fide
prospective purchasers, as well as contiguous property owners.140
The 2002 amendments to CERCLA, therefore, exempt a past or
present owner or operator who has land contiguous to contaminated
property and who did not participate in the contamination of his or
her own property. 141 All of these owners and operators must
undertake "all appropriate inquiry" before their acquisition in order
to qualify for the exemptions.
This all-appropriate inquiry is
discussed in the next section. Furthermore, if the contiguous
property owner knows of the contamination of the site before his or
her acquisition, they lose the status of an exempt contiguous
landowner and must revert to the exempt status of a bona fide
prospective purchaser. 143 Contiguous property owners are entitled to
an EPA opinion of their status; 44 others must rely on the discretion
of state agencies or courts for an opinion.
Under the 2002 brownfields amendments to CERCLA, innocent
contiguous landowners, new bona fide prospective purchasers, and
innocent landowners must take reasonable care of the property while
they own it.145 The innocent landowner who truly does not learn of
contamination before acquisition of a site is further removed from a
contamination problem than the other two exempt parties. Although
these exempt parties should not have to clean up the site, they may
have to give notice to state agencies of any contamination, install
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(q).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 9607(q)(1)(C).
Id. § 9607(q)(3)(A).
Id. § 9607(a)(1)(A)(iii).

204

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

fences in contaminated areas, cooperate with agencies and maintain
any existing barriers to prevent contamination from escaping. 146 This
is referred to as taking4 7 "reasonable steps" under the 2002
amendments to CERCLA.
EPA issued guidance to property owners on March 9, 2003,
describing the common elements of these exempt owners, including
the taking of "reasonable steps.'' 148 However, EPA did not define the
meaning of "reasonable steps." Future EPA guidance or rule-making
is expected. At a minimum, if an innocent landowner becomes
aware of contamination after the acquisition, he or she cannot allow
the site to sit vacant and remain completely susceptible, allowing the
contamination to spread.
The absence of due care will invalidate a
1 49
case.
that
in
defense
Sustainability is achieved as long as the landowners take
reasonable steps to prevent the spread of any contamination on site.
The scope of that duty remains unclear. It may be problematic for
them to pursue other responsible parties who caused the
contamination long after the fact. 150 The uncertainty for the new
landowners may chill the redevelopment initiatives voiced in the
2002 amendments to CERCLA. That would not strike the cause for
sustainability.
B. EnvironmentalSite Assessors
EPA regulations will soon define the standard for conducting due
diligence audits of property as a prerequisite to establishing defenses
to liability under CERCLA. Under the 2002 amendments to
CERCLA,151 Congress required EPA to promulgate regulations that

146. Id. at §§ 9601(35)(B)(i)(I) (commenting on innocent
landowner), 9601(40)(D) (commenting on bona fide prospective
purchasers (all appropriate care)), 9607(q)(1)(A)(iii) (commenting on
contiguous property owners).
147. Id.
148. MILLAN, ETAL., supra note 19 at §4:11, Chart 4.1
149. Containerport Group, Inc. v. Am. Fin. Group, Inc., 128 F.
Supp. 2d 470 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
150. See infra Section E for a discussion of volunteers later in this
part.
151. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
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define "all appropriate inquiry [AA].
This new definitional basis
establishes the innocent landowner defense and the contiguous
property owner and bona fide prospective purchaser exemptions to
CERCLA liability. 53 EPA did not meet the January 11, 2004
statutory deadline for promulgation of such regulations. 154 Proposed
AAI rules were not issued until August 26, 2004.151
In 2002 Congress authorized an interim standard for use by EPA:
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E
1527-00, Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessments:
Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Process. 156 ASTM Phase I
site assessment standards have been in existence for many years and
have served as the commercial guidance for conducting property due
diligence. Until the 2002 amendments to CERCLA, the ASTM
standards did not necessarily have any legal force or effect. 57 They
also do not address what CERCLA "reasonable steps" will be
required of otherwise non-liable landowners who discover past (or
off-site source) contamination, as discussed above.' 58 "Data gaps"
inherent in the site assessment process will likely drive landowners to
more and more "reasonable steps" to quell suspected contamination.
Perhaps that is the agenda of new AAI rules.
The most important distinction between ASTM and EPA is that an
EPA promulgated standard faces the rigors of administrative
152. 42 U.S.C. §9601(35)(B)(ii).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§9601(35)(B)(i)()
(innocent landowner),
9601(40)(B)(i)
(bona
fide
prospective
purchaser)
and
9607(q)(1)(viii)(I) (contiguous landowner).
154. Standards were only proposed on August 26, 2004, not
finalized. See infra, note 155.
155. Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, Part II,
69 Fed. Reg. 52542 (proposed Aug. 26, 2004). The rule was
finalized on November 1, 2005. See Standards and Practices for All
Appropriate Inquiries, 70 Fed. Reg. 66070 (Nov. 1, 2005) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 312).
156. Clarification to Interim Standards and Practices for All
Appropriate Inquiry Under CERCLA, 68 Fed. Reg. 24, 888 (May 9,
2003).
157. Environment, Energy and Resources Law, The Year in Review
2004, (ABA 2005) at 65.
158. Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 69 Fed.
Reg. 52,542, 52,560 (proposed Aug. 26, 2004).
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rulemaking and will then have the force and effect of a rule,
including being subject to EPA interpretations. In contrast, ASTMs
commercial practice is only incorporated into a rule and is still
subject to the environmental professional's judgment and experience.
EPA seems to acknowledge that the adequacy of an AAI is for a
judicial, not EPA determination.' 59
It does appear the scope of the AAI, presently known as the Phase
I Environmental Site Assessment, will expand and be more costly.
More negative report findings (e.g., data gaps) may mean that fewer
contaminated property deals will close. Nevertheless, the states
voluntary remediation/clean-up programs are structured to benefit
purchasers/lenders of brownfields. An AAI report will also be the
first step in this redevelopment process and obtaining a Brownfields
grant. It remains to be seen if the new AAI favors or disfavors
brownfield redevelopment
and sustainability, but it will favor a select
1 60
band of site assessors.'
C. Minority and Impoverished Communities
Many still view minority and impoverished areas as being subject
to a disproportionate share of pollution, increased risks and
contamination threat.1 61 The law is soft on this area and there
appears to be no one single solution in sight. 162 Should the goal of
sustainability be to exercise preferential options for the poor and
oppressed?
The EPA has proposed a Toolkit for Assessing Potential
Allegations of Environmental Injustice. 163
Under EPA's
methodology, this toolkit utilizes a tiered approach to assess whether
a locale has been potentially subject to a potentially and
159. Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 69 Fed.
Reg. 52,542, 52,558 (proposed Aug.26, 2004).
160. See infra Appendix A for a comparison of AAI and Phase I.
161. Robert D. Bullard, Mississippi River Symposium, Building
Just, Safe, and Healthy Communities, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 373
(1999).
162. MILLAN, ET. AL, supra note 19, § 8:17.
163. Environmental Protection Agency, Toolkit for Assessing
PotentialAllegations of Environmental Injustice (draft September 8,
2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
publications/ej/ej-toolkit.pdf (last visited May 25,2005).
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disproportionately high adverse environmental and human health
impact from pollution. 164 EPA, after receipt of an environmental
injustice complaint from a locale, conducts an on-site visit while also
researching existing databases for environmental, health, social and
economic indicators of environmental injustice. 165
While EPA's model is designed only for a tentative conclusion of
an environmental injustice at the screening level, EPA may share its
data with the state permitting agency. 166 A more refined assessment,
including health studies and subsurface contamination studies, may
still be needed before negotiations with facility owners can begin.
Although the assessment is envisioned mainly for permit processing
and not for clean-up enforcement, the EPA draft notes many
statutory factors for assessing penalties. 168 These include other
general factors as justice may require and suggest that these general
factors may incorporate a heightened penalty assessment for
environmental injustice infractions where appropriate.' 69 The model
could also serve to target clean-up sites and levels in some cases.
Appendix C to the draft, Example Application of the Environmental
Justice Assessment Methodology, contains a summary of EPA's
method on70 a hypothetical town, not unlike some locales in
Louisiana.
The methodology entails six steps: Step 1, problem formulation,
includes context, scope, participants, community of concern,
reference community, assessment endpoints, indicators for
assessment, conceptual model and analysis plan. 17 1 Step 2 includes
identification of environmental sources of stress and likelihood of
exposure, including number of regulated facilities in a community,
length of time, number of permit violations, number of non-point
sources of pollution, noise levels, proximity, multiple stresses,
potentially highly exposed groups, number of biomarkers of
exposure (blood or tissue studies), environmental conditions
(including air, water and other media), and environmental
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. §4.
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vulnerability (climate, etc.). 172 Step 3 includes an assessment of
potential adverse environmental conditions and impacts. 173 Step 4
includes an assessment of potential adverse human health and
welfare impacts. 174 Step 5 includes the characterization of the
community of concern (demographics, vulnerability factors such as a
lack of public transportation, sewage treatment, etc.), government
commitment, community participation in government and its
economic status.1 75 Step 6 includes the assessment of potential for
disproportionately high and adverse impacts.176 The final step
includes a tentative conclusion and sharing of information with the
77
state agency and the possibility of approaching the facility.
Additional study, however, is envisioned at this stage in the EPA
model. 178 In other words, there may be no end to the assessment and
the model may be frustrating to communities.
Dr. Barbara Allen's recent publication provides an overall
assessment of the history and methodologies available to assess
environmental injustice along the Louisiana Industrial Corridor; her
model of national pollution. 179 Her book contains strong rhetoric, but
nevertheless, P8resents a good historic summary of environmental
justice issues. 0 In the book, a "feminist" approach is often referred
to as standpoint theory or as "strong objectivity" to help solve
environmental justice in Louisiana. 18 1 This method uses the
experience of community members to form the basis for asking
questions, developing theoretical concepts, designing research,
collecting data, and interpreting findings.
This process may start
with simply interviewing residents, examining public records and
83
placing the results of this general survey on a neighborhood map.'
172. See id. § 4.
173. See id. § 4.
174. See id. § 4.
175. See id. § 4.
176. See id. § 4.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See BARBARA L.
2003).
180. See generally id.
181. See generally id.
182. Id. at 118.
183. See id.

ALLEN,

UNEASY ALCHEMY (M.I.T. Press,
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The map shows the proximity of the community to polluting facilities
184
and attempts to delineate health problems among the community.
This data can then be presented to an agency like the LDEQ or EPA.
In other words, according to the book, "feminist" theory starts with
the live community as a center point rather than starting with the
polluting facility.' 85 It also starts with the perspective of individuals
and does not accept all scientific methods (including risk-based
corrective action) as bias free.' 86 In this way, Dr. Allen suggests that
a community science advocate can collect data on health clusters
among the inhabitants of a community.187 Her approach does not
solve all sampling or data concerns. Indeed, comparison of data
from small towns to that of data from broader populations serving as
control groups, and the use of statistics to avoid chance findings
188
remain cornerstones of the scientific method.
Absent a long-term solution for preventing contamination or
requiring clean-up or relocation of minority communities, there can
be no sustainability. "Risking away" a community's health concerns
places people as "quotients" of scientific notations they cannot well
understand.
Sustainability
requires communication,
not
mathematical guess work. Integrating community acceptability into
the risk assessment scheme is a goal. 189
D. "Old" Indemnitors
Private parties can re-allocate risk from environmental liabilities
among themselves by an indemnity agreement, but indemnities
cannot be used to bar agency actions.' 9° What surprises many
businesses is that older indemnities negotiated prior to CERCLA can
be found to apply to new environmental claims under CERCLA. 191

184.
185.
186.
187.

See id. figs. 5.2 -5.3.
Seeid.
See id.
See id.

188. RONALD E. GOTS, Toxic RISKS, SCIENCE, REGULATION, AND
PERCEPTION (Lewis Publications 1993).

189. See Northwest-Midwest Institute, supra note 29, at 130-131.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2); see also Jocelyn Mfg Co. v. Koppers
Co., 40 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1994).
191. Id.
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For instance, a 1994 court decision held that certain indemnity
agreements completed in 1938 and 1949, undertaken before the
passage of CERCLA, were intended to cover all forms of
environmental liability, though environmental statutes were not
92
specifically contemplated at the time of the underlying transaction.
Certain broad language like indemnifying one for "any and all claims
and expenses" may cover CERCLA clean-ups in the future.
However, other courts examine the state public policy to see what
effect a state gives to indemnity agreement language in an
environmental context. 193 In another case in 2000, dealing with
transactions from 1969 and 1973, a facility was sold subject to an
indemnity against "all claims ... arising from ownership or operation
of the [a]ssets . . . and accruing from and after [c]losing."'19 4 The
indemnity laws of the states involved express different tests in
determining the scope of the indemnity. 19 5 The indemnities in
question did not expressly cover either negligence or strict liability
claims, such as those arising from CERCLA.196 The court found that
under state law
the indemnity claims were basically unenforceable
97
1
liability.
strict
CERCLA
to
with respect
The Department of Defense was surprised recently when it found
that old indemnity agreements it had with war-time contractors are
still effective today in subjecting the federal government to liability
for CERCLA clean-ups of those manufacturing sites.198 For
instance, in the Ford Motor Co. case, 199 Ford was a manufacturer
under a government contract to make bomber planes during World
War 11. 200 Ford was then required to clean-up its manufacturing site
192. Id.
193. Fina, Inc. v. Arco, 200 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2000), rehearingand
suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, 210 F.3d 365 (5th Cir.
2000).
194. Id. at 268.
195. Id. at 269-271.
196. Id. at 271-274.
197. Id.
198. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2004); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 365 F.3d
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cadillac Fairview/Cal. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
299 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
199. Ford,378 F.3d at 1314.
200. Id.
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by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources. 20 ' Although Ford
was assigned only nine percent of the total clean-up costs, it
demanded reimbursement from the federal government. 20 2 The
federal government denied its request for reimbursement. 20 3 The
court found that the government was liable under the Contract
Settlement Act of 1944 in light of the World War II indemnity
agreement. 04 The court cited cases that held indemnity provisions in
World War II contracts providing that "the government shall hold
[contractor] harmless against any loss, expenses... or damage of any
kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the performance
with the work under this title...," also covered later arising CERCLA
claims. 205 The court found that the equivalent clause in Ford's
contract included as allowable cost "loss or destruction of or damage
to property as may arise out of or in connection with performance of
20 6
the work under this contract" also covered CERCLA claims.
The dissent disagreed that the indemnification clauses in World
War II contracts required the government to reimburse Ford for its
contribution under a then future unknown CERCLA settlement.20 7
The dissent felt that the parties could not have intended in World
War II that the indemnification clause would cover future claims
208
based on CERCLA.
However, this is obviously not a view
accepted by the majority of courts today.
It seems that good or bad luck befalls indemnitors under past
agreements. Sometimes they are not liable, and of course they would
contend there was no intent before 1980 to subject themselves to a
future liability under a law not conceived at the time of the
transaction, called CERCLA. Bad luck can befall them, however,
more so to the extent that they are more deep pockets available to
fund clean-ups. Although the scope of the indemnities remain
unclear as long as federal courts must interpret both state law and
CERCLA in deciding the scope of the indemnity, burden shifting to

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1319, citing Dupont, 365 F.3d at1373-74.
Ford, 378 F 3d at 1319.
Id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1321.
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solvent parties does not seem to be inconsistent with CERCLA
sustainability.
E. Volunteers

We have seen in the prior part of this article that redevelopers have
achieved some of the boom under the brownfield and voluntary
remediation programs around the country. One drawback is a recent
case before the United States Supreme Court, regarding the issue of
whether volunteers who have begun a partial clean-up may in turn
obtain contribution from those who are responsible for the
contamination in the first place.
In a 2001 case, Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.,2 °9

the Fifth Circuit initially held that a volunteer may not sue other
responsible parties for contributions under Section 9613(f(1) of
CERCLA, to cover clean-up costs incurred. 2 The case involved a
purchaser of maintenance sites in Texas that had become
contaminated from leaking underground storage tanks operated by
the seller, Cooper, and later the purchaser, Aviall. 211 The Texas
environmental agency informed the purchaser it was in violation of
environmental law, but took no judicial or administrative
the sites
enforcement action against it.212 The purchaser cleaned 2up
13
CERCLA.
under
contribution
for
seller
and then sued the
On rehearing en banc, 214 however, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
panel's majority decision. The court en banc ruled that clean-up
volunteers, without prior EPA or other potentially responsible party
civil actions, may nevertheless file a CERCLA contribution claim
against others. 2 15 The court did not resolve whether the volunteers

209. 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001), rehearinggranted,278 F.3d 416
(5th Cir. 2002).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir.
2002).
215. Id.
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may use only contributions or cost recovery mechanisms to recover
the clean-up costs.2 16
The Supreme Court granted certiorari21 7 on the question of whether
a private party who has not been the subject of an underlying civil
action pursuant to CERCLA contribution or cost recovery actions
may bring an action under Section 9613(a)(1) seeking contribution
under CERCLA to recover costs spent voluntarily to clean up
property contaminated by hazardous substances. 218
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court, through statutory interpretation and environmental apathy,
reversed and simply rejected a clean-up volunteer as having a
CERCLA contribution action against a responsible party for its
clean-up costs. The Court refused to consider the varied purposes of
CERCLA in its ruling. 22 The Court held that, reading Section
9613(f)(1) plainly and as a whole, only a party who is subject to a
civil action under Section 9606 (abatement) or 9607 (cost recovery)
of CERCLA can sue under Section 9613(f)(1). 22 Aviall, though
cleaning up at the request of a state agency, was not a party to a prior
9606 or 9607 civil action. 222 The Court did not decide if Aviall had a
Section 9607(a) cost recovery action or an implied contribution
action under Section 9607(a), but in dicta implied based on past
223
jurisprudence that Aviall did not have a CERCLA cause of action.
This implication was probably based in part on Aviall's status as a
216. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(1), 9607(a). Here, the volunteer was a
responsible party and thought it could only use the contribution
procedures.
217. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
218. Petition for A Writ of Certiorari at Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Aviall Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577, 583-85 (2004)(No. 02-1192).
219. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004).
220. Id. at 584.
221. Id. at 583.
222. Id. at 582.
223. See id. at 584 n.5 (The Court also neither addressed if an EPA
abatement order (absent a consent decree) under Section 9606 is a
"civil action" triggering a Section 9613(f) contribution action, nor
did it address the scope of any potentially responsible person Section
9607 action - considering policy issues of joint and several liability,
statutory limitation periods, and contribution claim bars based upon
clean-up settlements with the state or federal governments).
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responsible rather than innocent party and in part on Congress' 1986
codification of CERCLA implied contribution actions under Section
9613(f). The dissent read CERCLA more broadly and felt the Court
should at least decide on the other causes of action (cost recovery and
implied contribution) under CERCLA 4
One aftermath of this finding is increased litigation over the nature
of any implied contribution actions under Section 9607 or other
causes of action under federal environmental laws (i.e. Resource
Conservation Recovery Act) or state mini-CERCLAs. 225 The cleanup at many voluntary remediation sites may also become slower and
more complex, as such sites do not necessarily require EPA
involvement or federal or state judicial or administration enforcement
or settlement action.
Enforcement action may be needed, if
requested by voluntary clean-up participants, in addition to the
routine technical submissions, reviews, and agreements at such
voluntary sites.
Truly innocent volunteers who purchase
contaminated sites after first qualifying for a CERCLA responsible
party exempt status, however, may still possibly benefit from a
Section 9607 or state cost recovery action. Remember, Aviall was
not an innocent party under CERCLA and apparently could not use
the traditional Section 9607 cost recovery mechanism. Aviall did,
however, place private Section 9607 actions in a state of turmoil,
absent future Congressional or judicial clarification.
Volunteers may choose not to seek recovery of their cost, however,
as they may be content with the prize of their redevelopment and
partial clean-up allowed under brownfields or partial remediation
programs. Nevertheless, there will be a percentage of redevelopers
who do wish to seek recovery of their clean-up costs, regardless of
whether any further clean-up or not must be undertaken by others.
Oddly, the problem may relate to federal facilities operated by
224. Id. at 586-88.
225. Three district courts have already denied Section 9607(a) cost
recovery actions to Potentially Responsible Parties after Aviall.
Elementis Chem., Inc. v. TH Agric. & Nutrition, 205 WL 236488
(S.D. N.Y. 2005); AMW Materials Testing v. Town of Babylon, 348
F. Supp. 2d 4 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); City of Waukeshna v. Viacom Int'l
Inc., 2005 WL 712423 (E.D. Wisc. 2005). However, Vine Street,
LLC v. Keeling held a volunteer Potentially Responsible Party
lacking a section 9613(f) claim, has a section 9607 claim. 2005 WL
675786 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
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contractors or by future owners who voluntarily clean up without
indemnities. 226 This unknown may deter that portion of developers
227
from redeveloping the some 450,000 -1,000,000 brownfields.
That uncertainty or loss would be a strike against sustainability.
V. CONCLUSIONS

In these days when neo-Malthusians question the environment's
limited resources and see people as the greatest threat to Earth as
polluters, 228 we must question whether CERCLA is really serving
the goal of sustainability. This is debated in the context of global
warming, land degradation through deforestation, desertification and
development, and air and water pollution. The issues of land
degradation certainly must include contamination.
Trends incurred in the redevelopment of brownfields through
voluntary remediation programs support sustainability. This trend
protects greenfields from the stress of development. Though
voluntary remediation places a lesser burden of clean-up on innocent
parties, it does not free liable parties from the obligations with
respect to remnants of contamination left on brownfields. Providing
larger loopholes for some parties, such as parent corporations, does
not serve the ends of sustainability. Federal Superfunds are drying
up, and the federal government needs as many responsible parties as
possible to have a fair share in the clean-up. Discouraging volunteers
from acquiring brownfields, however, is a negative trend if they do
not wish to be involved in new site assessment regulations or do not
have the prospect of cost recovery and contribution when needed.
Indemnitors who are liable for new CERCLA claims tend to
compensate, at least at some contractor operations and facilities, the
loopholes that let others escape. The growth of the pollution
insurance industry in terms of coverage and clean-up policies also
provide additional revenue resources.
Some parties are left
226. See Brief of Amici Curiae Lockheed Martin in support of
respondent at 6-7, 24-29, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc.,
(Apr. 8, 2004).
227. GAO-Community Development, supra note 29, at 118
(Nationwide, 450,000 brownfields await clean-up and conversion to
productive uses); Northeast-Midwest Institute, supra note 29, at 2
(estimating the number of brownfields to be as many as 1 million).
228. Wolfgram, supra note 33, at Part II.
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untouched, however, because they are lost in the environmental
justice movement.
One solution is to have a "sustainability advocate" as a member of
the team of decision-makers, rather than as the often scorned peanut
galleries or advisory committees. This advocate should be trained in
risk and sociology so she can communicate with communities and
also debate at arms length with the bureaucrats and statisticians.
Only truly low risks would then be risked away.
Additionally, the 450,000 - 1,000,000 brownfield sites should be
tracked through new EPA "score cards" that are more understandable
to the public.229 Environmental indicators must replace bean
counting cubic yards of dirt removal.
Another solution is sustainable brownfield reuse. 230 Beyond use
restrictions, site enhancements should include open space, parks,
smart growth (providing residents with options to live, work, and
play within walking distance), "green buildings" (research and
development into energy efficiency plus "green roof' systems to
cleanse and reuse storm water in landscaping), and housing
environmental friendly companies (recyclers). More state brownfield
programs should add incentives for sustainable re-use through
revolving loans, grants, tax 2credits,
loan guarantees, loss reserves,
31
and environmental insurance.
On balance, CERCLA's prospect for long-term sustainability of
the planet is a mixed bag. When it meets sustainability, it seems it is
more due to chance than design. It must be remembered, CERCLA's
remediation approach is akin to using restoration to save the planet,
as indeed if neo-Malthusians are correct, the planet is past saving in
the pure sense. To the extent there can be lessons learned from
CERCLA, including remediation and clean-up, making the polluter
229. Katherine N. Probst, et al., Success for Superfund: A New
Approach for Keeping Score, Resources for the Future (April 2004),

available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPT-Superfund
Success.pdf (last visited May 25, 2005). See also Strategy to Ensure
Institutional Control Implementation at Superfund Sites, (EPA Jan.
2004), which requires EPA to return its focus on Potentially
Responsible Parties if institutional controls are not implemented
long-term, e.g., easements, orders, public notices in use, etc.
230. Northeast-Midwest Institute, supra note 29, at 10, 102-12.
231. STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS:
AN UPDATE FROM THE STATES, 7 (EPA 2005).
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pay, insuring that the clean-up is completed to proper health-based
standards, requiring good corporate governance of the brownfields so
that pollution does not reappear, and maintaining clean-up status, that
can help us avoid repeating the contamination errors of the past and
serve to benefit developing international laws modeled after
CERCLA.232 In that way, CERCLA, as well as other laws that
provide for restoration can help us save a planet. The planet "saved,"
however, will be the next one inhabited by humans, not necessarily
the Earth. All Earth can be is a selectively restored world with the
hope it lasts for as long as possible. Thus, sustainability may meet
its
233
true test through NASA in Bradbury's chronicled world at last.

232. See Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1228 (1993).
233. Ray Bradbury, The Martian Chronicles (Spectra 1950).
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APPENDIX "A"

COMPARISONS OF AAI AND PHASE I
Section 312.10 of EPA's proposed rule states its purpose is to provide
for CERCLA defenses, exemptions and brownfield grants. The standard
covers both hazardous substances and petroleum releases (which relate
mostly to the brownfield programs), and emphasizes the potential
disclosure obligations of the environmental professional under
environmental laws, e.g., reporting. 234 ASTM Section 1 similarly
defines commercial and customary practices but does not discuss the
potential disclosure obligations of the professional. Thus, the duties of
the site assessor remain slightly unclear but clients may still expect
confidentiality of their business transactions.
Section 312.10 of EPA's proposed rule defines an "environmental
professional," one who may lawfully conduct or supervise the AAI,
more narrowly than ASTM section 3.2.12 in terms of state licenses,
degrees, and years of experience. This could lead to a proliferation of
state licensing requirements; the EPA will not propose a licensing
scheme.
Individuals with ten years of relevant experience are
grandfathered under EPA's proposal. It is incumbent on their customers
to demand that they are properly credentialed.
Section 312.20 of EPA's proposed rule allows for the use of prior
environmental site audits by purchasers, but establishes more rigorous
conditions than existing ASTM standards. EPA requires reviews of the
prior information with reference to the pending real estate transaction.
ASTM Section 4.7.2 allows use of a prior assessment if site conditions
have not materially changed in the opinion of the user. EPA's proposed
provision allows for the inclusion of information collected in
compliance with the final AAI rule within the prior year and imposes
certain additional updating requirements, e.g., interviews and record
checks, that must be conducted within 180 days before purchase.
ASTM Section 4.6 does not mandate updating a report less than 180
days old. Most important, the EPA proposed rule affirms the date of
title transfer as the date before which AAI must be accomplished.
234. 40 C.F.R. §§ 312.1(d), 312.21(d). However, EPA explains
that the proposed rule contains no new reporting requirements.
Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 52551.
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ASTM Section 4.5 contains principles that a site assessment does not
eliminate
uncertainties, is not exhaustive, and allows for variable
• •• 235
inquiries.
The EPA standard does not state similar flexibility
principles. Rather it focuses on identification of information on current
and past uses and occupancies, current and past uses of hazardous
substances, waste management and disposal activities that caused
releases or threatened releases, current and past corrective actions,
engineering and institutional controls, and adjoining and nearby
properties with conditions indicating releases to the subject property.
It also focuses on performance factors requiring environmental
professionals to gather relevant information within a reasonable time
and costs that are practicably reviewable and to review the information
for thoroughness and reliability. 237 This may drive a consultant to stress
the significance of "data gaps."
Section 312.20(f) of the EPA's proposed rule provides that "data
gaps" must be described and suggests but does not mandate that
sampling be conducted to develop information to address those data
238
gaps. The ASTM standards contain a similar concept, "data failure",
but do not require any sampling for a Phase I investigation. 2 39 This new
EPA approach may eliminate the tiered approach between a Phase I and
II, if the environmental professional states that any "data gaps" are
significant.
Section 312.21 of EPA's proposed rule requires interviews, reviews
of government records, visual inspections and so forth. Section 6 of the
ASTM standard has similar requirements for a Phase I investigation.
The proposed EPA standard places greater emphasis than the ASTM
standard, on past operations and on activities on adjoining properties.
Section 312.23 of EPA's proposed rule requires interviews of past and
present owners and also requires interviews of owners or occupants of
adjacent properties in the case of "abandoned properties," but does not
specify questions to be asked or the number of people to be interviewed.
ASTM Section 9 requires only interviews of present owners, including
site managers. Section 312.24 of EPA's proposed rule requires inquiry
into initial structures on the property and when it was first used for
residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, or government
purposes. ASTM Sections 7.3 and 7.3.2 only require the environmental
235. See ASTM, Standard E 1527-00, §§ 3.3.27, 7.1.4.3.
236. Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 69
Fed.Reg. 52,542, 52,577 (proposed Aug. 26, 2004).
237. Id. at 52578.
238. ASTM, supra note 235 § 7.3.2.3.
239. Id., supra note 235 § 6.4.
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professional research back to 1940 for undeveloped land or when the
property was first developed, whichever is earlier.
Section 312.25 of EPA's proposed rule suggests that the
environmental professional search for liens but allows the client to do
the search instead. ASTM Section 5.2 requires the user to provide lien
information to the environmental professional.
Section 312.26 of EPA's proposal requires the environmental
professional to search for federal, tribal, state or local records, on the
subject property and on adjoining properties. Search for public health
records regarding the subject property is also required. The proposal
also establishes search distances for nearby properties but provides that
those distances may modified based on professional judgment. ASTM
Sections 7.1.7, 7.2 and 10 are not as detailed on local government
searches and rely more on interviews with local government officials.
Search distances on nearby facilities are similar. 24° ASTM does not
require inquiry into public health records.
Section 312.27 of EPA's proposal requires visual inspections of the
subject property and adjoining properties.
ASTM Section 8.4.1.3
requires that current uses of adjoining properties be identified if the
properties appear impaired (contaminated). The EPA proposal is more
onerous and requires the professional in "good faith" to seek access of
adjoining sites or explain why efforts to gain access were unsuccessful.
Visual inspection from other vantage points are also options EPA's
proposal allows if there are access problems, e.g., snow, overgrowth,
high water, and so forth.
Section 312.28 provides that the person conducting the inquiry must
account for specialized knowledge of the subject property and
surrounding area. ASTM Section 5.3 only requires users to report
specialized knowledge to the environmental professional, if known.
Section 312.29 of EPA's proposal imposes an obligation on the inquirer
to consider the fair market value of the subject property and compare the
price to the value of the pro erty, as if not contaminated. A real estate
appraisal is not required.
ASTM at Section 5.4 requires actual
knowledge of price disparity by the user before it is described in the
environmental report. Section 312.30 of EPA's proposal broadly
requires the environmental professional to gather information about
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information.
This
information includes the professional or personnel experience of the

240. Id., supra note 235 § 7.1.2.1.
241. Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 69 Fed.
Reg. 52,567.
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purchaser or the consultant. 242 Section 5.2.1 of the ASTM standard
does not require use of information that is not recorded. EPA's
proposed standard appears to require a more exhaustive investigation.
Section 312.31 of EPA's proposal requires that the environmental
professional's report include an opinion regarding additional appropriate
investigation. ASTM Section 11 states the primary focus should be on
finding certain recognized environmental conditions, i.e., releases, and
provides that any additional opinions or work scope be assessed in the
terms of an engagement letter. Thus, the new reports may mandate a
never-ending story.

242. Id.

